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Michele Ruth Gamburd
Migrant Emplacement: Gendered 
Subjects, State Regulations, 
and the Discursive Erasure 
of Elders in Sri Lanka 
Abstract Discriminatory assumptions about family structure and care 
work underlie a 2013 Sri Lankan state regulation, referred to as the “Family 
Background Report” (FBR), which restricts the transnational labor migra-
tion of women with children under the age of five. Since the early 1980s, 
women from Sri Lanka have worked as domestic servants in Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. A culture of migration has devel-
oped, and labourers’ remittances sustain family financial strategies. The 
FBR regulations narrow people’s employment options and destabilize 
long-standing practices of intergenerational reciprocity. Using ethno-
graphic data gathered in 2015, the chapter considers the potential and 
actual consequences of these rules for migrants and care-giving grand-
mothers. 
The focus on women’s “emplacement” provides a crucial counterpoint 
to current theoretical discussion in the migration literature on issues of 
“deportability.” Scholars have convincingly argued that uncertainty around 
a migrant labourer’s right to stay in the host country constitutes a form of 
structural violence and creates a docile, productive workforce. Compared 
to the adverse effects migrants experience under threat of deportation 
(inability to stay in the host country), FBR restrictions (inability to leave the 
country of origin) creates converse but equally oppressive situations of so-
cial suffering and precarity for migrants and their families. The research 
contributes to discussions in political anthropology about interactions be-
tween the family and the state.
Keywords migration, gender, aging, South Asia, Sri Lanka
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Introduction: Nuclear family narratives at work in extended 
family settings
In many countries, normative discourse about ideal households empha-
sizes a nuclear family in which both biological parents live with their 
children and the mother stays at home, at least until the youngest child 
starts school. In the United States, youngsters learn these stereotypes 
in school through popular reading primers (Scott et al. [1940] 2004), and 
television shows reinforce the norms. However, most households fail to 
match the stereotype. According to a 2013 Pew Research Center survey, 
only 46 per cent of children under the age of eighteen in the US lived in 
a household with both their biological parents; 15 per cent lived with two 
parents, of whom one or both had remarried; and 34 per cent lived with 
only one parent (Livingston 2014). Only a minority of American children 
currently live in the “ideal” family structure.
Which families “fail” to live up to the implicit standard? A brief report 
from the Council on Contemporary Families based on US census data sug-
gests a correlation between household income and family structure; the 
poorer and less educated are more likely to get divorced, and more likely 
to have children outside of marriage than are richer, better educated indi-
viduals (Cavanagh 2015). And in those poor families, grandparents play 
a major role in raising children. People in the middle and upper classes 
have a better chance of reproducing the “ideal” family. But the “normative” 
family is not the norm, particularly for America’s working class, in which 
grandparents participate actively in household reproductive strategies. 
Despite evidence of the effective, creative diversity of “non-normative” 
family structures, stereotypes attributing all manner of social ills to these 
types of families persist (Stacey 1996). Scholars note that the discourse that 
idealizes nuclear families with stay-at-home mothers implicitly marks as 
abnormal the kin structures of the working poor, particularly in communi-
ties of colour (Stack 1974). In popular discourse, the lack of fit with norma-
tive, middle-class family structures is deemed to cause the social problems 
faced by the working poor. In the United States, conversations about fam-
ily structure often carry implicit racist, ageist, and classist messages. 
How do norms about ideal families function in other parts of the world? 
In this chapter, I explore the hegemony of normative middle-class fam-
ily structures and the erasure of grandparents in a contemporary debate 
underway in Sri Lanka, where I have done qualitative ethnographic field-
work on ageing and migration since 1992. In Sinhala, the heteronormative 
nuclear family is referred to as the “ratarang pawula” or “golden family.” 
I argue that, in Sri Lanka, powerful narratives about the middle-class 
nuclear family are trickling down to trouble working class people (particu-
larly migrant women and elders) who live in complex, “non-normative,” 
extended families. Ill-advised migration policies based on stereotypes 
about ideal families have a profound adverse impact on female transna-
tional domestic workers and their elderly kin. 
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This chapter examines the assumptions about family structure and care 
work that underlie a recent Sri Lankan state regulation, referred to collo-
quially as the Family Background Report (FBR), which restricts the trans-
national labour migration of women with children under the age of five. 
Since the early 1980s, women from Sri Lanka have migrated to the Middle 
East to work as domestic servants in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE). A “culture of migration” (Brettell 2015, 155) has devel-
oped, with labourers’ remittances forming a key part of a family’s finan-
cial strategies. The recent change in Sri Lanka’s migration policy “grounds” 
many women who would otherwise choose to work abroad, thus disrupt-
ing household trajectories and plans. Emplaced in their homes, younger 
mothers can no longer migrate as domestic workers to support their fam-
ilies. And the policy affects the jobs and financial strategies of other kin as 
well; with their daughters and daughters-in-law at home, older women are 
no longer needed in their households to look after their grandchildren, 
a situation that destabilizes long-standing practices of intergenerational 
reciprocity. 
Using ethnographic data gathered in 2015, I delve into current ethno-
graphic realities, considering how extended families in rural Sri Lanka deal 
with these politically persuasive but practically inappropriate restrictions, 
and the potential and actual consequences of these rules for both migrants 
and elders. I evaluate how the FBR rules affect household finances in fami-
lies that have in the past depended on female migration, and I explore how 
the regulations force poor families to adjust to employment options newly 
narrowed by gender, age, and parental status. I am especially interested 
in the effects of the policy on women of the grandparent generation. This 
category of individuals does not figure in the discourse about “the golden 
family” that seems to justify the new regulations. However, the FBR policy 
substantially disadvantages this portion of the population. 
The analysis contributes to several ongoing anthropological conversa-
tions and debates. First, this project addresses the conjuncture of gender 
and old age in South Asia. In Sri Lanka, as elsewhere in the developing 
world, rapid population ageing is increasing the numbers and propor-
tions of older women and men, many of whom lack financial security. Like 
many other countries that are poised to undergo the demographic shift, 
Sri Lanka is not yet prepared to support its elders (World Bank 2008). Fol-
lowing the pioneering scholarship of Sarah Lamb (2000, 2009) on ageing 
in India, this research aims to address a gap in the literature on the expe-
riences of women (particularly poor women from rural communities) as 
they age in Sri Lanka.
Second, this research advances scholarship on the intersection between 
ageing and migration. It forms part of an ongoing ethnographic project on 
the conjunction of a demographic shift towards an ageing population struc-
ture in Sri Lanka (Gamburd 2013, 2015) and the long-term dependence on 
remittances sent by men and women labouring as guest workers in the 
Persian Gulf and, more recently, elsewhere around the world (Brown 2011; 
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Frantz 2008, 2011; Gamburd 2000, 2008b; Näre 2010). The kinship configu-
rations that have served extended families in Sri Lanka well since the onset 
of female migration in the early 1980s have been thrown into flux. 
Third, the focus on women’s “emplacement” provides a crucial coun-
terpoint to the current theoretical focus in migration literature on issues 
of “deportability” (Boehm 2009, 2011, 2012; de Leon 2015; Holmes 2013; 
Peutz and de Genova 2010; Talavera et al. 2010; Vora 2013). Scholars have 
convincingly argued that uncertainty around a migrant labourer’s right to 
stay in the host country constitutes a form of structural violence (Farmer 
2004; Gardner 2010a, 2010b) and creates a docile, productive workforce. 
Drawing on case studies of two extended families directly affected by the 
FBR policy, I examine the effects that the new regulations have had on 
two generations of women: women in their twenties and thirties who wish 
to migrate, but because of the FBR policy cannot, and women in their fif-
ties and sixties who are available to care for their daughters’ children, but 
because of the new policy are denied this avenue of contributing to their 
extended families. Compared to the adverse effects migrants experience 
under threat of deportation (inability to stay in the host country), I sug-
gest that FBR restrictions (inability to leave the country of origin) create 
converse but equally oppressive situations of social suffering for migrants. 
Fourth, I take a close look at the ongoing politics of representation 
in the dominant discourse about families, and how the state uses this 
discourse to justify the new regulations. More specifically, I look at the 
absence of elders (particularly grandmothers) in the discussion, as well as 
assumptions about ideal families and the roles that mothers “should” play 
in them. The new restrictions that the FBR policy places on women’s mobil-
ity draw directly upon assumptions about age, gender, and (lack of) proper 
family relations in migrant workers’ families (Nicholson 2006; Parrenas 
2005). I have written extensively in the past regarding the mutual influ-
ence between gender roles and migration (Gamburd 2000, 2008a, 2008b). 
In this chapter, I explore and critique the assumptions about age, gen-
der, and family structure that underlie the regulations as they are revealed 
and debated in an exchange of letters between the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and the Sri Lankan Ministry of Foreign 
Employment. Rhetoric supporting the regulations relies on a series of ste-
reotypes about women, men, children, and family relations that do not 
fit the ethnographic profile of the community in which I do my fieldwork. 
Using Sherry Ortner’s analytic framework of “serious games” (2006), I ask 
which stakeholders in the local and national power structure benefit from 
circulating the inaccurate stereotypes and “benching” Sri Lanka’s “army 
of housemaids” (Gamburd 1995), and the erasure and marginalization of 
grandparents, particularly grandmothers. Results of this research con-
tribute to ongoing debates on intergenerational obligations, linked lives 
(Lloyd-Sherlock and Locke 2008), and global “householding” strategies 
(Douglass 2014, 313), as well as analysis in political anthropology about 
interactions between the family and the state.
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Sri Lanka’s “Family Background Report” policy 
In 2013, the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) changed the regulations gov-
erning women’s migration for work as transnational domestic servants, 
sending shock waves through local communities that relied on women’s 
remittances. The new conditions for migrant women arrived in Sri Lanka’s 
Districts and Divisions through a series of government circulars. Locally, 
people refer to the resulting policies as “The Family Background Report” or 
“FBR” issue, or, more colloquially, as “the baby problem.” 
In the FBR circulars, the Government of Sri Lanka set age limits and 
other restrictions on women migrating as domestic servants. (A 2015 cir-
cular extended the provisions to cover all women migrants, regardless of 
employment category [Ministry of Foreign Employment 2015; Sri  Lanka 
Mirror 2015]). The FBR policy dictates that Sri Lanka’s migrant domestic 
servants must have attained a minimum age (ranging from twenty-one 
to twenty-five, depending on country of destination), and can be no older 
than fifty-five. In addition, all married women need their husbands’ signa-
ture on the FBR paperwork before they can migrate. Women who have chil-
dren under the age of five will not be “recommended” to work abroad, and 
women with children older than five must demonstrate adequate plans for 
their care. In contrast, men are allowed to migrate at age eighteen, and 
the government sets no upper age limit on their overseas employment. 
No restrictions apply to fathers of young children, and husbands do not 
need their wives’ permission before going abroad (GoSL 2014, 6; Ministry 
of Foreign Employment 2015). 
The promulgation of these rules, particularly the new paperwork 
involved for the FBR, prompted debate and litigation. Feminist organiza-
tions filed a fundamental rights case challenging the FBR policy as discrim-
inatory. After Sri Lanka’s Supreme Court found in favour of the government 
in September 2013, women’s organizations brought the issue to the United 
Nations (UN). Debate unfolded in 2014 between the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and the Sri Lankan Ministry of Foreign 
Employment; I examine those debates in detail below. Conversations con-
tinue in Sri Lankan civil society (Mudugamuwa 2013; Sunday Times 2013; 
Sooriyagoda 2015; Women and Media Collective 2016). Despite sugges-
tions that the government might repeal the FBR regulations, the policy still 
stands as of April 2019 (Daily Mirror 2015; Daily News 2018; Dissanayake 
2015; Kiyanna 2016). 
The FBR policy affects a broad spectrum of Sri Lanka’s population and 
has significant implications for care work, gender relations, and the role of 
elders in intergenerational kinship obligations. National regulations focus-
ing on migrant women carry broad implications for these would-be work-
ers’ families, with specific impacts on the kin work (Coe 2017) performed 
by members of the grandparent generation. The change in state policy 
adversely affects elders at a time of important transition in population age-
ing and labor migration. 
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Background: Trends in ageing and migration 
Sri Lanka finds itself at the confluence of a demographic transformation 
and an ongoing engagement with international migration (Gamburd 2013, 
2015). In terms of demography, Sri Lanka’s population structure is shifting. 
From a pyramid with many youth and few elders, the demographic profile 
is transforming toward a column with roughly equal numbers of young, 
middle-aged, and elderly people (de Silva 2007; Gamaniratne 2007). This 
shift, which countries in the Global North have already undergone, brings 
with it predictable challenges for social reproduction. Elders need to 
remain financially active for a longer period, and individuals in the “sand-
wich generation” struggle to care for kin who need extra attention. 
Many developed countries have dealt with the care deficit by hiring 
nannies from the Global South. The overseas demand for eldercare is likely 
to continue to grow in the United States, Japan, and the European Union 
as neoliberal state policies in labour-receiving countries continue to pri-
vatize care work and women in those countries turn to market proxies to 
fulfil their own filial duties.1 As scholars have repeatedly pointed out in 
cases worldwide, migration patterns affect family strategies for caring for 
household members. Although a number of scholars have written about 
the effects of migration on the children of migrants, fewer have examined 
migration outcomes for elders. Care for elders is an issue of growing global 
importance, particularly in the face of widespread population ageing now 
taking place in developing nations.2 
Along with millions of other women, Sri Lanka’s transnational domes-
tic workers fulfil care needs around the world, mostly in the Persian Gulf. 
The Sri Lankan Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE), the government’s 
main administrative body regulating labour migration, estimates that 
half a million Sri Lankans worked abroad in 1994. The number doubled to 
one million in 2003, and by 2010 had increased to nearly two million. The 
number likely has continued to rise. (Since 2012, the SLBFE has not offered 
estimates of the total stock of migrants working overseas.) Migrants thus 
make up roughly 10 per cent of the country’s twenty million population 
and a quarter of the country’s working-age population.3
Sri Lanka depends on migrant remittances for foreign exchange. 
Ninety- two per cent of Sri Lanka’s migrants go to the Persian Gulf. In 2012, 
1 For information on the role of migrant women in filling the global care deficit, 
see Chang (2000); Ehrenreich and Hochschild (2002); Hondagneu-Sotelo (2007); 
Ibarra (2002); and Sassen (2002).
2 For trenchant discussions of care strategies created for migrants’ families, 
see Cole and Durham (2007, 12); Kusakabe and Pearson (2015); Magazine and 
Sanchez (2005); McKay (2015); Parrenas (2005); and Rao (2015). For migration’s 
effects on migrants’ children, see Athauda et al. (2000); Gamburd (2008b); 
Nicholson (2006); and Parrenas (2002, 2005). For effects on elders, see Lamb 
(2009); Liu (2014); Locke and Lloyd-Sherlock (2011); Lloyd-Sherlock and Locke 
(2008); Locke et al. (2013a, 2013b), and Huijsmans (2013).
3 For statistics on Sri Lankan migration, see SLBFE (2012, 2015). 
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half of the migrants departing from Sri Lanka were women; that figure has 
decreased over the past two decades from a high of roughly 75 per cent 
female in the mid-1990s. Since that time, both male and female migration 
has continued to increase, with numbers of male migrants increasing more 
rapidly. In 2012, total remittances from migrant workers abroad amounted 
to US$ 5.4 billion; fifty-seven per cent of this figure, or US$ 3.1 billion, came 
from the Gulf. In generating foreign earnings, migrants’ private remit-
tances accounted for over half of the country’s total. Sri Lanka’s economic 
well-being is thus closely tied to policies and events in the Persian Gulf.4
In making decisions about labour migration, families make economic 
calculations that reflect some national and international trends. Based on 
the research that I did in 2015, transnational domestic workers in the vil-
lage where I do my fieldwork earned an average of US$ 150–250 a month 
while abroad. The median monthly per capital income for Sri Lanka was 
LKR 7,881 in 2012–2013 (Department of Census and Statistics 2015, 9), or 
about US$ 62. This means that a “housemaid” could earn abroad between 
two and a half and four times what she (or anyone else working in her 
family) could earn in Sri Lanka, and that a housemaid’s wages equalled 
or exceeded the wages earned by most village men. Several studies sug-
gest that each migrant supports four to five members of his or her fam-
ily (Weerakoon 1998, 109; Jayaweera et al. 2002, 1). Roughly one million 
of Sri Lanka’s migrants are women, and each migrant woman supports 
four family members, suggesting that five million people, or 25 per cent 
of Sri Lanka’s population, depends on migration for employment or 
remittances. 
In addition to using migrant remittances to support their daily con-
sumption needs, families often see migration as a good strategy to pro-
cure money for one-time, large-scale purchases. Most migrant women 
state that they wish to buy land and build a house. They calculate that they 
can earn enough to accomplish this by working for four to five years in the 
Gulf. In addition to securing better housing, women’s motives for migra-
tion usually include getting out of debt, educating their children, providing 
dowries for themselves or their daughters, and starting small businesses 
(Gamburd 2003). Participants in the decision-making process (undergone 
repeatedly for migrants who return several times to the Gulf) weigh finan-
cial necessity and household improvements against separation, incursion 
of loans, and alternate arrangements for childcare. Grandparents and 
their care work often figure centrally in household discussions. 
How will poor families in developing countries deal with the demo-
graphic shift? “In slightly more than two decades, Sri Lanka’s population 
will grow to be as old as Europe or Japan’s today, but its level of income 
will be much lower” (World Bank 2008, i). A heartening number of schol-
ars are currently studying and talking about the care work conundrum 
for people who are torn between migrating abroad to earn money and 
4 See SLBFE (2006, 2015) for more statistical information. 
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staying home to provide elderly kin with hands-on support (Hoang and 
Yeoh 2015; Parrenas 2002). In Sri Lanka at the moment, however, the issue 
of women having to choose between migrating and looking after elders 
seems to be moot. Ethnographic data I gathered in July and August 2015 
reveals that due to the state’s policy barring women over the age of 
 fifty-five from going abroad, female migrants can rarely stretch their time 
overseas beyond the age of fifty-seven or fifty-eight. There are plenty of 
able-bodied, middle-aged women around to do care work for children and 
frail elders. Nonetheless, the nexus of transnational migration and pop-
ulation ageing remains a pertinent topic of analysis. In particular, in the 
past, young women relied on older women relatives to take care of their 
children while they worked abroad (Gamburd 2008b). Now neither set of 
women can migrate, to the financial detriment of the entire household. 
In 2008, the World Bank advised Sri Lanka to take steps to enhance 
the economic activity of elders. In the past, elderly kin offered unremuner-
ated but financially significant household labour by caring for their grand-
children while transnational domestic workers migrated abroad. But FBR 
regulations have rendered these elders’ kin work superfluous, just as this 
population begins to increase dramatically. 
Limited options: The view from Naeaegama
Since 1992, I have conducted ethnographic research in a village that I call 
“Naeaegama,” which is located near the coast in southwestern Sri Lanka.5 
Families in this village, which had a population of roughly 1,250 in 2015, 
rely on a number of subsistence strategies, including employment in the 
armed services, the tourism industry, and international labour migra-
tion, as well as agricultural work in cinnamon production. During recent 
research, I heard about unemployed daughters and daughters-in-law wait-
ing for their children to have their fifth birthdays—and often also having 
more children while they were at home (thus extending the period during 
which they could not go abroad). I heard about the financial concerns of 
families that could not send a worker abroad despite having ample mature 
adults available to care for frail elders and children. I explore two of these 
cases below.
LIMITED OPTIONS I: THARINI 
Pemawathi, a spry older woman (aged sixty-five in 2015), spent her nights 
at the unfinished cement house of her granddaughter Tharini (aged 
thirty- two in 2015). Pemawathi’s presence lent respectability to Tharini, 
who lived with her two young sons. Tharini had been abroad in the Gulf 
5 “Naeaegama” is a pseudonym, as are the names of individuals in the following 
case studies. 
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before; while she was gone, her husband had several affairs with other 
women. Tharini divorced him. He paid child support, but the payments 
did not provide enough for Tharini to run the household, let alone finish 
building her house. Tharini’s mother (aged fifty in 2015), who had worked 
for over two decades in the Gulf while Pemawathi looked after Tharini and 
her two siblings, had provided Tharini with some funds to complete the 
doors and windows of the house before retiring from her job in the Gulf 
and joining Tharini’s elder sister and brother in Italy. During an interview, 
Tharini explained that living is expensive in Europe; only one of the six fam-
ily members in the household in Italy was working, and they could not 
send much money back to Sri Lanka. 
Tharini’s younger son was three years old. Tharini wanted to go abroad 
(either to join her mother, sister, and brother in Italy or to work in the Gulf). 
Because of the FBR policy, she could not go for another two years. She wanted 
to work abroad so that she could finish constructing her house, furnish it, 
and save for her future and for the education of her kids. She was confident 
that her grandmother would live in her house and look after her children 
while she was away. Other relatives lived nearby and could offer childcare 
and support if needed. In return, when her grandmother became old and 
infirm, Tharini planned to support and look after her. Tharini’s elder sister 
and brother would support their mother. Tharini’s inability to migrate or to 
find a well-paid local job frustrated her and negatively affected her financial 
status. With the ban in place, Pemawathi could not support her granddaugh-
ter as much as she would have liked, and the delay undermined Tharini’s 
ability to earn enough money to look after her grandmother in the long term. 
The FBR policy narrowed the household’s employment options and destabi-
lized their fiscal strategies, potentially harming multiple generations of kin.
LIMITED OPTIONS II: DEEPTHI 
In another extended family with an extensive migration history, both 
 Krishanthi (aged fifty-two in 2015) and her husband had spent time work-
ing in the Gulf while their parents looked after their children. More recently, 
Krishanthi had looked after her granddaughter when her son  Parakrama 
and his wife Deepthi were both abroad. After the younger couple returned 
home, Deepthi had a second daughter, who in 2015 was one year old. 
Because of this child, in compliance with the FBR policy, Deepthi could not 
go abroad again to work, even though Krishanthi was available to take 
care of the youngsters (as were other women in the household). 
When I spoke with the family in July 2015, they were in dire finan-
cial straits. They had invested Parakrama and Deepthi’s Gulf money in a 
mechanic shop, but the business had failed. Parakrama was trying desper-
ately to obtain a good job in Dubai; he had given up his prior employment 
in hope that he could make money with the now-failed business. Parakrama 
had purchased a ticket from his own funds and flown to the UAE on a visitor 
visa to try to find work. He secured a tenuous promise of employment, but 
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at the time of our interview, the situation was in limbo due to a company 
slow-down of issuing visas, a case of appendicitis, and the upcoming expi-
ration of Parakrama’s medical certification. He was unwilling to find work 
through a recruitment agency due to the many cases of male guest workers 
discovering upon their arrival in the Gulf that their jobs did not match the 
employment they thought they had signed up for (Gardner 2010b). In addi-
tion, Parakrama had already spent his remaining savings on the ticket to the 
Gulf; he did not have the funds to get a job through an agency. Parakrama’s 
future employment seemed uncertain, and the whole family was anxious.
In the past, the family would likely have opted to send Deepthi abroad 
while her mother-in-law Krishanthi looked after the grandchildren. Com-
pared with jobs for men, jobs for women are plentiful, quickly obtained, 
and more predictable in their pay and duties. Deepthi could have gone 
abroad and supported the family while Parakrama found local employ-
ment. With Deepthi’s earnings, the family could have paid a job agency 
for another job for Parakrama; once Parakrama had a job, Deepthi could 
return to Sri Lanka at the end of her contract. By “emplacing” Deepthi, the 
FBR policy effectively “grounded” both her and her husband and greatly 
reduced the entire family’s ability to sustain itself. The policy also dis-
empowered Krishanthi, undermining her ability to support the financial 
wellbeing of the household. And it did not seem to me that the situation 
benefitted the one-year-old child “protected” by the FBR. 
Potential negative effects of the FBR policy
In the past, Sri Lanka had successfully regulated migration and channelled 
people abroad through legal avenues. The implementation of the FBR cir-
culars may be changing that trend. When the rules of the migration game 
change in ways that disadvantage poor, working-class migrants, they are 
likely to seek ways around the new prohibition to continue to access the 
economic benefits that they formerly achieved through migration. The FBR 
policy is likely to drive women migrants out of the sphere of state regulation. 
As the ongoing refugee crisis in Europe indicates, people move as 
necessity dictates, regardless of state attempts to secure international 
borders (Sassen 2016). In August 2015, I spoke with activists and scholars 
in Colombo, the capital city of Sri Lanka. Several themes emerged from 
these conversations. One expert suggested that the FBR policy would 
cause some migrants to overstay their work visas, or to go abroad not 
as migrants but as “visitors” and overstay those visas (see Women and 
Media Collective 2016). Another expert noted the need to have local jobs 
available for the women who could not go abroad due to the FBR policy. 
The  Sri Lankan government claimed that the FBR policy had decreased 
women’s migration (GoSL 2014, 2), a point that other research supports 
(Weeraratne 2014). In the year following the implementation of the policy, 
the government reported a 6.4 per cent reduction in departures of female 
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domestic migrant workers (United Nations 2015, 9), and in the subsequent 
year departures dropped a further 12.8 per cent (Kiyanna 2016). Data 
from Sri Lanka’s Central Bank reveal that while fewer women went abroad 
through official migratory channels, there was a concomitant increase in 
other types of departures from Sri Lanka (Mirror Business 2016). Overall, 
female migration through regular channels appears to be decreasing, 
while irregular migration appears to be increasing, with both changes 
likely related to implementation of the FBR policy. 
BY FAIR MEANS OR FOUL: FOOLING THE SYSTEM
In Naeaegama, people worried that migrants were working around the 
state’s FBR requirements and that a new stream of labourers were going 
abroad illegally. While doing fieldwork, I heard informed speculation 
regarding how much it might cost to bribe a local-level village administra-
tor to write a certificate with false information about parental status. Vil-
lagers discussed a multitude of ways to go abroad without interacting with 
the state’s system. Other sources report similar concerns (United Nations 
2015, 35–36, 46; Women and Media Collective 2016). During an interview, 
Pemawathi (introduced above) and my interpreter talked about one of the 
local subagents who had allegedly been able to send a woman abroad 
even though she had a child who was a year and a half old. My research 
associate did not think that the child in question belonged to the woman in 
question, but Pemawathi was sure that the woman was indeed the mother.
Skirting the rules potentially endangered not only migrants but also 
those who helped them. During an interview with another subagent, 
the subagent explained, “Now Sri Lanka has a lot of laws. For example, a 
woman with kids under five years old can’t go abroad. The Divisional Secre-
tary’s office checks. They need to know the ages of the children. Also, they 
check to make sure that her husband is okay with her going abroad. He 
has to sign.” The subagent continued, “Now with the baby problem, there 
are a lot fewer women going abroad. I don’t want to tell lies, so I only take 
people who don’t have young kids.” The subagent went on to explain why 
women wished to leave their children and go abroad, even though the leg-
islation forbids it: “There can be household problems. The husband’s sal-
ary might not be enough. There isn’t enough money for education. People 
need money for medicine, for funerals, for weddings. A man might make 
LKR 1,500 per day (about US$ 11) for labour work. He needs to buy food. 
He needs to pay the light bill and the water bill.” I asked, “So, a family needs 
two salaries?” The subagent replied, “If you have four adults in a house, all 
of them need to be working! Otherwise there’s not enough money.” Work-
ing-class families that supply the vast majority of transnational domestic 
workers rely financially on sending women abroad. In many cases, having 
a young mother stay home without a job to look after her offspring is not 
a viable householding strategy, particularly when able-bodied elders are 
available to provide child care. 
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A bit of theory
Why did Sri Lanka implement the FBR policy in 2013, even though doing 
so would decrease remittances from abroad and increase undocumented 
and extra-legal migration? Ten years ago, I praised Sri Lanka for not fall-
ing into a “patriotic protectionist trap” (Gamburd 2005, 103) and ban-
ning female migration (as opposed, for example, to the ban around that 
period on female migration from Nepal [O’Neill 2001, 153]). I thought that 
 Sri Lanka’s dependence on women’s remittances would make restricting 
their migration financially impossible. What has changed and why did it 
change in 2013?
One thing to consider for understanding the implementation of 
Sri Lanka’s FBR policy is the locally circulating discourses about gender 
and migration. How do the stereotypes of family relations, gender roles, 
and age categories that populate the rhetoric naturalize the arguments 
that support the regulations (Yanagasako and Delaney 1995; Biolsi 2007)? 
Pierre Bourdieu suggests that “the cultural construction of reality … is a 
major dimension of political power” (1977, 165). In this case, the politics of 
representation plays a key part in official state justifications of the new pol-
icies and initiatives which, in turn, guide the state allocation of resources 
and state agencies’ attempts to police the movements of the populace and 
the (re)production of the population through the surveillance of women’s 
motherly functions and intrusions into the family home (Foucault 1979; 
Rose 1999). The stereotypes about family structure that support the FBR 
policy depend on erasing the role that grandparents play in Sri Lanka’s 
extended families. The dominant stereotypes in the FBR debate bear a 
strong resemblance to normative Western discourses about the desirabil-
ity of a nuclear family in which the mother stays home to look after the chil-
dren. Care work done by grandmothers and grandfathers does not figure 
in those discourses and stereotypes. 
In her discussion of agency, power, and projects, Sherry Ortner (2006, 
129–153) explores the analogy of real life as a series of serious games. She 
compares game games and serious games in a number of useful ways. 
First, serious games, like game games, have rules. Unlike in most game 
games, however, in serious games people often engage in rewriting the 
rules in the process of playing the game. Government policies provide a 
prime example of the “rules” by which people play, and by critically exam-
ining policies that are being debated and modified, ethnographers can get 
a glimpse of the game as it changes. Here I think of Raymond Williams’ 
definition of hegemony as a process rather than a structure, and one that 
is “continually … renewed, recreated, defended, and modified. It is also 
continually resisted, limited, altered, and challenged” (1977, 112). History 
is where we see the results of these struggles played out (Ortner 1989). 
Second, according to Ortner (2006), serious games, like game games, 
have teams. According to Ortner, people can be drafted unwillingly to 
serve on a team; they can also, as this case illustrates, be barred from 
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participating. This element in Ortner’s game analogy prompted me to 
ask who the “teams” are in the FBR situation. In the “game” analogy, one 
could say that in the game of migration, the government has “benched” 
the migrant women and the caregivers who used to look after the families 
left behind. Why do this? It makes little sense when considering the game 
of migration. Is there another game afoot? If so, who benefits from the 
new rules? 
A third point in Ortner’s analogy is that serious games, like game 
games, have winners, losers, and prizes. Which people lose or what do 
they risk failing to accomplish? These are “serious” (real) losses or gains, 
unlike what one wins or loses in a game game. Who plays, and for which 
prizes? If individual families and the country as a whole lose remittances 
by banning women’s migration, then what do they win in exchange? Are 
politicians perhaps making allegiances with voters? Which voters benefit 
from the new policies? Are we seeing a gendered relationship between the 
state and men? Will the policy change have bad effects on the relationship 
between the state and elders, and the state and women? Is the policy a 
form of class warfare? As Williams suggests, hegemony is “the lived dom-
inance and subordination of particular classes” (1977, 110). Why has the 
state crafted a policy that disadvantages migrant women and the elders in 
their households? I am not sure that I have answers for these questions, 
but at least now I have the questions.
The debate about Family Background Reports 
Although abhorrent to feminists, scholars, and human rights activists, the 
FBR policy has significant support in Sri Lanka. At the very least, many peo-
ple refuse to speak out against it. Citing survey data, the United Nations 
reported that government service providers and most non-government 
service providers commonly expressed views such as these: “Children 
under five years need the mother’s love,” “mothers have to protect their 
children,” and “it is the duty of the mother to the family to make sure the 
children are loved and protected” (United Nations 2015, 30). Many govern-
ment workers felt that “the migration of women for domestic work must 
be stopped altogether” (United Nations 2015, 32). Interviewees did not rec-
ognize a grandmother’s love as sufficient for a child. 
In Naeaegama, I found an odd mix of views on the FBR. For example, I 
spoke with Pemawathi’s younger son’s wife (aged forty in 2015), who had 
recently returned from Singapore and had used her remittances to finish 
constructing her house. She thought that the FBR was a good policy. But 
she herself had first gone abroad when her daughter was three. She felt 
that her daughter was well cared for in her absence; her own mother and 
her mother-in-law Pemawathi had looked after her child, as had her hus-
band. Nevertheless, she asserted without seeming to see any contradic-
tion, “When you’re a mother, you should be home.” No one seemed able 
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or willing to put into words (let alone legitimize) the role that grandmoth-
ers had played for many years in reproducing working-class families with 
migrant mothers. 
To understand the assumptions about gender, age, and family that jus-
tify the FBR policy, I provide a discourse analysis of the key documents 
opposing and supporting the regulations as they are revealed and debated 
in an exchange of letters between the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights and the Sri Lankan Ministry of Foreign Employment. I 
also include interview data from activists and policy-makers. I argue that 
to understand current and upcoming trends in Sri Lanka’s migration policy, 
it will prove useful to uncover the politics of representation at work in the 
regulations and figure out the economic stakes of these serious games. 
THE UNITED NATIONS’ POSITION
Soon after the Sri Lankan Supreme Court upheld the legality of the FBR 
policy, women’s organizations in Sri Lanka sent a complaint to the United 
Nations (UN). In January 2014, the UN sent the Government of Sri Lanka 
a letter stating that the FBR policy discriminates against women, perpet-
uates negative stereotypes, restricts freedom of movement, and violates 
human rights (United Nations 2014). 
Both the UN and the Sri Lankan activists focused their critique on the 
assumptions about gender inherent in the government’s justification of 
the FBR policy and the adverse effects of the policy on migrant women. 
The UN critiqued the claim that the policy “is not discriminatory as it is 
aimed at protecting women and children” and challenged the gender ide-
als inherent in the view that women are “the force that binds the family” 
(United Nations 2014, 2). The UN letter claimed that the GoSL policy does 
indeed discriminate against women (United Nations 2014, 2), based on the 
following facts: the policy pertains only to women, not to men; it adversely 
affects women’s ability to move and work, particularly by requiring a male 
relative’s permission; it potentially increases the incidence of illegal migra-
tion and human trafficking; and it reinforces gender stereotypes, particu-
larly that child care is solely the responsibility of mothers. The UN called 
upon a variety of international conventions to support its argument.
In a 2015 publication on the effects of the FBR, the United Nations 
suggests, 
The ‘dysfunctional’ families of poor women migrating overseas 
for employment are at the heart of an impassioned debate about 
‘family breakdown’ in Sri Lanka. The absence of the mother, it is 
argued, leads to the neglect of children, resulting in school drop-
out, early marriage, and vulnerability to sexual abuse. Moreover, it 
is said that husbands of migrant women are prone to alcoholism 
and extra-marital relationships, making the female migrant’s family 
even more susceptible to disintegration (2015, 15).
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The UN document succinctly analyzes the classist, sexist assumptions 
behind these claims, noting that the discourse blames migrant women 
for situations that grow out of systemic poverty. Similarly, Dr. Sepali 
 Kottegoda, Executive Director of the Women and Medic Collective, offered 
an emphatic denunciation of the FBR policy from a feminist perspective 
(interview, 10 August 2015). She took issue with the policy because it con-
tained no accountability for the father. She lamented that the policy had 
been implemented in absence of solid social science research showing 
that child abuse arose from female migration, whereas plentiful research 
showed the socio-economic causes for such family problems. 
Elaborating on the faulty assumptions about gender roles, Kottegoda 
noted that the policy assumes that the women are mothers only; it does 
not discuss jobs for women. Further, in implicitly absolving fathers of auto-
matic equal responsibility for children, it sends a message that society 
“can’t trust fathers” to perform their parental duty. The current discourse 
in the media about men is that they abuse children, commit incest, drink, 
waste money, and womanize.6 The predominant narrative fails to profile 
supportive husbands and couples who handle migration successfully. 
 Kottegoda suggested, “All these people are wearing blinders about gender 
roles.” She noted that people assume that “the mom takes care of the kids 
and the dad works outside the house.” She suggested that “the guilt and 
the morality” of the dominant discourse overwhelmed evidence from the 
social sciences and the voices of the migrants.
Although Kottegoda aptly noted that the “ideal family” that the pol-
icy assumes is a “feel-good fiction,” her critique focused on assumptions 
about mothers and fathers in a nuclear family context. It did not address 
the predominant group of caregivers in migrant households: grandpar-
ents, particularly grandmothers. In other words, her critique focused on 
stereotypes related to the roles that appear in the policy and its defense; 
she did not question the larger issue of how grandparents came to be 
excluded from the discussion in the first place. 
RESPONSE FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKA
In May 2014, replying to the UN’s January letter, the Government of 
Sri Lanka sent a ten-page response. In this section, I examine argu-
ments from the letter and from an interview done in August 2015 with 
Mr. Mangala Randeniya, the SLBFE’s Deputy General Manager for Foreign 
Relations and Publicity and the Bureau’s Media Spokesperson. Randeniya 
argued for the ban in the Supreme Court case, which his side won. 
Providing an overarching rebuttal to the points in the UN’s letter, the 
government asserts that the UN has failed to pay enough attention to “the 
totality of facts and circumstances related to the issue of low-skilled female 
migration for employment outside Sri Lanka and its consequences to the 
6 See also Gamburd (2000) for a discussion of such stereotypes.
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Sri Lankan children and families left behind” (GoSL 2014, 2). The govern-
ment’s letter asserts that the FBR policy addresses “the need to safeguard 
the family unit as the fundamental unit of society,” particularly “the rights 
of the Children [sic] in a most vulnerable social stratum” (GoSL 2014, 10). 
The government argues at length for the need to keep the mother in the 
household, asserting that only she can care properly for her children. As 
with the arguments presented by the UN and feminist organizations, the 
government’s analysis completely elides the productive caregiving role 
that grandparents often play in Sri Lanka’s extended families. In short, 
both analyses erase elders from the household and ignore the role they 
play in long-term life-cycle planning. 
GENDER, BIO-POWER, THE FAMILY, AND THE STATE 
Ortner’s focus on serious games points scholars to ask how a change in 
rules advantages and disadvantages different groups of people. I hope 
that the evidence and analysis presented thus far makes clear that female 
migrants and their families suffer from the new FBR policy. Who, then, 
benefits? 
The FBR policy brings state scrutiny into working-class households in an 
impressive demonstration of bio-power. A phalanx of state workers stands 
ready to protect children and families from the alleged dangers of female 
migration. These administrators include “Women Development Officers, 
Child Rights Promotion Officers, Early Childhood Development Assistants, 
Social Service Officers and other officers who all serve under the admin-
istrative supervision of the Divisional Secretary of the Division,” as well as 
the village administrator (Grama Niladhari) and the Public Health Midwife 
(GoSL 2014, 6). For women with children over the age of five but under the 
age of eighteen, in addition to certifications, letters, and signatures from 
the above-mentioned civil servants, the FBR form requires a signature 
from a woman’s husband, who thereby asserts the veracity of the details 
on the form, agrees that he has no objections to his wife’s migration, and 
agrees to the childcare arrangements outlined on the form (Ministry of 
Foreign Employment 2015). In requiring a wide range of paperwork and 
signatures, the state exposes migrant women’s families to intense scrutiny 
and regulation, while simultaneously subjecting the women to the arbi-
trary power of their husbands and any number of government employees. 
Although in theory a migrant woman with children over the age of five 
could navigate the paperwork and work abroad if she “could put her chil-
dren in safe hands during her absence” (Emirates 24 / 7 2013), the state 
does not seem to support this avenue of female employment. Newspaper 
coverage of the policy reports that a high-ranking official claimed that the 
“SLBFE has taken the decision to prevent the female workers, who have 
too many domestic issues, from going overseas” (Mudugamuwa 2013). 
The FBR policy portrays women as bad mothers if they leave the country. 
With government intervention to keep mothers at home in “their place,” 
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these same women apparently magically transform into good mothers. 
Controlling women’s mobility allows the state to govern these subjects for 
their own improvement and protection, as well as the protection of their 
children. These discursive manoeuvers completely fail to address the car-
egiving role that the extended family (particularly grandmothers) plays in 
family migration strategies. 
ECONOMICS
Poverty and lack of good local jobs for men or women impel migrants to 
seek work in the Gulf. The government’s letter briefly touches on the his-
tory of labour migration from Sri Lanka to the Middle East. Overall, how-
ever, it makes surprisingly little mention of what women could do to assure 
their families’ economic survival. Instead, the letter discusses the social 
costs of migration for children—without discussing potential social costs 
that children might pay if their families lacked enough money to provide 
them with food and shelter. 
The government argues that the FBR policy protects women from 
making poor decisions. In its letter to the UN, the Sri Lankan government 
suggests that migrant women workers have “low skills” and “low levels of 
education,” and thus “face numerous exploitative and abusive situations 
in work” (GoSL 2014, 3). (The United Nations argues that these quoted 
terms are euphemisms for “poor” [2015, 20] and that the original FBR 
circulars’ focus on transnational domestic workers was undeniably clas-
sist [GoSL 2014, 25].) The government seems particularly wary of what 
migrant women might do when enticed with large recruitment bonuses 
(GoSL 2014, 2). In theory, recruitment bonuses have existed for over three 
decades, though in practice for several decades the funds served to offset 
some but not all of the costs incurred by a migrant preparing to go abroad. 
Most Naeaegama women who migrated in the 1990s and 2000s incurred 
debts in order to go abroad, and women I spoke with in 2015 were quite 
pleased with the cash-in-hand that they (or their families) could now 
receive from labour recruiters. In the past, large debts in Sri Lanka often 
forced migrant men and women to remain in untenable work situations 
abroad for fear that without their remittances, their families would lose 
land, houses, and jewelry that had been mortgaged or pawned to pay the 
recruitment agency (Gamburd 2000; see also Gardner 2010b). Incentive 
payments decreased family vulnerability and reduced the risk and uncer-
tainty that migrants faced. However, the incentives indubitably disquieted 
government officials. 
Lack of clear planning constitutes another element of the GoSL defense 
of the FBR. The government’s letter suggests that the procedure in the 
circular provides “a service that can assess a family and develop a plan 
to help them” (GoSL 2014, 5). In thirty years of studying labour migration 
from Naeaegama, I have never come across a family that did not strate-
gize, plan, and take great care in their decision-making regarding whether 
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or not to send a migrant abroad and how to care for family members in the 
migrant’s absence. Why the sudden governmental concern in 2013 that 
families needed help with their planning? And what fuelled the assumption 
that navigating a phalanx of civil servants would provide “a service” rather 
than an ordeal almost guaranteed to open opportunities for exploitation 
and corruption (see also Mirror Business 2016)? Perhaps the powers-that-be 
spied a way to absorb poor women’s incentive money into the system. 
The creation of government jobs provides another noteworthy aspect 
of the FBR policy. The government provided 1,000 college graduates with 
jobs in Divisional Secretariat offices to serve as Development Officers. 
Lack of stable jobs for college graduates has long been a political con-
cern, and most governments make it a priority to try to create employment 
for this educated and disgruntled sector of society. Many analysts blame 
lack of such employment for the Sinhala youth rebellions in 1971 and 1988 
(Hughes 2013). Perhaps in the serious game of preventing armed rebel-
lions, the employment of these educated, presumably rural, middle-class 
youth trumped the employment of 6–8,000 less-educated, rural, work-
ing-class mothers, and an equal number of caregiving grandmothers. 
The government makes an argument that the UN’s letter portrays 
women as individuals, whereas it would be better to view them as mem-
bers of families. Playing the serious game of citing truth claims from inter-
national legal structures and conventions, the government calls upon the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families (GoSL 2014, 5). The letter notes (GoSL 2014, 8), “An approach to 
human rights that treats human beings as discrete entities with equally 
discrete and separate rights flies in the face of multiple identities and rela-
tions that individuals possess.” Instead, the government argues for using 
“a more holistic and communitarian conception of a human being” that 
exists in “the human rights law developed in Europe in terms of Article 8 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
1950” (GoSL 2014, 8). But what version of “the family” undergirds the gov-
ernment’s argument? The “family” in question seems to lack grandpar-
ents and collateral relatives—the very people who have facilitated female 
migration for the past three decades. 
Conclusions
An analysis of the politics of representation and the cultural construction 
of identity in the FBR case reveals the prevalence (and importance) of nor-
mative gender roles and ideal images of the family in assigning roles to 
working-class men and women. In the ratarang pawula (golden family) 
assumed to exist (and to need protection) in the FBR discourse, the mother 
stays at home with the children and the father goes to work to earn money. 
In contrast with the ideal (bourgeois or middle-class) nuclear family, the 
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FBR strives to restrain working-class women who migrate, despite (or per-
haps because of) the young age of their offspring. These migrant women 
are variously portrayed as easily duped, vulnerable to abuse, and greedy 
for money. Their husbands fare even worse, assumed to abuse and neglect 
their children, drink, waste money, womanize, and commit incest. Accord-
ing to the FBR discourse, the government must step in to protect women 
from making bad decisions and to protect children from the predations of 
their uneducated, short-sighted, misguided parents. 
Completely missing from the picture of the golden family are grand-
mothers: the many women aged fifty-five and over who must (because of 
the same government policy) remain in Sri Lanka rather than migrating 
abroad. As much research shows (D. Brown 2013; Rodriguez-Galan 2013), 
grandparents play a crucial financial role in poor families by fulfilling inter-
generational care duties for family members. Their often-uncompensated 
kin work entitles them to financial and emotional support as they age. 
The FBR policy makes much of their informal kin work superfluous, thus 
undermining family financial strategies and pre-existing patterns of inter-
generational reciprocity. However, Sri Lanka can ill afford to undermine its 
elderly population, particularly as the country undergoes a demographic 
transformation towards a greater proportion of the aged. 
What happens when discourse about the golden family meets up with 
real working-class families who need to send women abroad to work? As 
illustrated in the case studies of Tharini and Deepthi, keeping would-be 
working mothers at home does not result in a middle-class utopia for their 
children. Instead, by “emplacing” these women, the state creates uncer-
tainty and financial instability in their extended families. 
In the consideration of serious games (Ortner 2006), dominant dis-
courses about age and gender play an important part in how team lead-
ers assign (or seek to assign) particular team members to particular tasks. 
In the FBR rhetoric, older women remain nearly invisible, despite featur-
ing prominently in the family networks that facilitate migration. Why are 
grandmothers not included in the narrative as crucial players in the serious 
game of working-class women’s labour migration? Although grandmoth-
ers’ kin work has for a generation allowed younger women to migrate, 
the FBR policy has effectively “benched” young mothers like Tharini and 
Deepthi, keeping them from playing the serious game of international 
labour migration. The policy has also “benched” Pemawathi and Krishanti, 
able-bodied caregivers who have lost the opportunity to perform a pro-
ductive role in their formally global households. 
Serious games, like game games, are played for prizes. In the migra-
tion project, players pay social costs and reap social and economic bene-
fits. For working-class migrant women, the economic benefits of working 
in the Persian Gulf are many and evident: women buy land; build houses, 
wells, and toilets; fund dowries for themselves and their daughters; pro-
vide education for their children; and finance small businesses (Gamburd 
2003; United Nations 2015, 37–38). They recognize the social costs of being 
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away, but pragmatically note that their children’s grandparents, aunts, 
uncles, and fathers can adequately take care of their social and emotional 
needs (Gamburd 2000, 2008b). As twenty years of my own ethnographic 
research reveals, families have developed successful strategies for global 
householding (Douglass 2014). 
When rules of serious games change, some people win and some peo-
ple lose. It seems clear to me that by barring young mothers from migrat-
ing, the state has imposed serious economic costs upon them. In addition, 
the state decreases its own income from foreign exchange; if Weeraratne’s 
preliminary analysis holds and 6,000 to 8,000 fewer women go abroad dur-
ing a year due to the FBR, then somewhere between US$ 10 million and 
US$ 24 million less comes to the country in remittances that flow directly 
to the poorest households. Finally, the state loses some control over the 
movement of people as women work around the FBR policy and migrate 
illegally. 
Who wins in the change of policy, and why might the policy have shifted 
when it did, in 2013? Several potential answers come to mind. First, the FBR 
policy provided job opportunities for 1,000 unemployed college graduates, 
a vocal middle-class population that the government has reason to fear, 
based on its experience with past youth insurrections. 
Second, because increasing numbers of men are migrating to the 
Gulf, the government can afford to shift its attention away from female 
migrants; indeed, an explicit policy has existed since 2009 to “actively pro-
mote male migration in order to stem women from migrating for domes-
tic work” (United Nations 2015, 11). In prior generations, migrant women 
were able to contribute greatly to the financial and social development of 
their families (Gamburd 2000). In the current circumstances, however, by 
“emplacing” so many women, the state creates financial uncertainty and 
anxiety and augments the local ranks of the working poor.
Third, the FBR paperwork created for potential migrants with children 
over the age of five opens a gray area of policy enforcement. One can 
easily imagine women’s substantial recruitment bonuses disappearing to 
grease the wheels and overcome bureaucratic hurdles. Ample evidence 
exists to show that working-class families will fall into debt in order to send 
a worker abroad; why let these families keep the incentive money when 
more powerful players could siphon it away? 
Fourth, even though it potentially drives migrants outside the reg-
ulated pathways, the FBR policy greatly extended state control and sur-
veillance over working-class families. A phalanx of government servants 
scrutinize kin work and childcare arrangements and make decisions about 
these families’ financial futures. The United Nations (2015, 39) reports 
that “Migration Development Officers and Women Development Officers 
often saw themselves as the moral guardians of children and families,” and 
that many of them gauge “the success of their work by the numbers [of 
women] they have prevented from leaving as domestic workers” (United 
Nations 2015, 41). 
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Fifth, the shift is likely related to the end of Sri Lanka’s long-standing 
civil war (1983–2009) and the gendered discourses tied up therein (Lynch 
2007). The paternalistic protectionist rhetoric perhaps appealed to male 
voters, particularly working-class male voters who found their control over 
their would-be migrant wives increased. Perhaps not coincidentally, the 
FBR policy went into effect just as the Sri Lanka Freedom Party—which 
came into power in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami of Decem-
ber 2004 and unified the country militarily in 2009—began to lose its grip 
on the nation. In January 2015, the incumbent lost the presidential elec-
tion, and in August 2015, the voters reiterated their rejection of the old 
government. Many of the experts with whom I spoke in 2015, mere days 
before this election, hoped that the new government would “not be the 
same as the old government” and would rely more on evidence than on 
emotion and rhetoric when it considered its policies. Despite its electoral 
success, however, the new government has not modified the FBR policy. 
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